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Abstract
Recently, Hassanpour and Houshmand have proposed a protocol of controlled deterministic secure quantum
communication (Quant. Info. Process, DOI 10.1007/s11128-014-0866-z (2014)). The authors compared the
efficiency of their protocol with that of two other existing protocols and claimed that their protocol is efficient.
Here, we have shown that the efficiency of Hassanpour Houshmand (HH) protocol is not high, and there exist
several approaches through which more efficient protocols for the same task can be designed. To establish this
point, we have proposed an efficient protocol of controlled deterministic secure quantum communication which
is based on permutation of particles (PoP) technique and is considerably efficient compared to HH protocol. We
have also generalized this protocol into its bidirectional counterpart. Interestingly, bipartite entanglement (Bell
state) is sufficient for the realization of the proposed protocols, but HH protocol and other existing protocols
require at least tripartite entanglement. Further, we have shown that it is possible to construct a large number of
efficient protocols of unidirectional and bidirectional controlled deterministic secure quantum communication by
using various alternative approaches and different quantum states. These alternative protocols can be realized
by modifying the existing protocols of quantum secure direct communication and deterministic secure quantum
communication. We have also shown that it is possible to design completely orthogonal-state-based protocols
for unidirectional and bidirectional controlled deterministic secure quantum communication.
1 Introduction
In 1984, Bennett and Brassard proposed a protocol of quantum key distribution (QKD) [1]. The protocol, which
is popularly known as BB84 protocol, drew considerable attention of the cryptographic community as the protocol
is unconditionally secure. As a consequence, several other protocols of secure quantum communication have been
proposed. Interestingly, in the early years of secure quantum communication, only protocols of QKD were proposed
[1, 2, 3, 4]. However, it was realized soon that quantum states can be employed to design the protocols for secure
direct quantum communication where we can circumvent the prior generation of keys (i.e., QKD), and thus, directly
communicate a message by using quantum resources. In the last few years, many such protocols of secure direct
quantum communication have been proposed. Such protocols can be classified into two broad classes: (a) protocols
for quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) [5, 6, 7, 8] and (b) protocols for deterministic secure quantum
communication (DSQC) [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. The difference between DSQC and QSDC is very small.
Specifically, in a DSQC protocol Bob (receiver) can decode the secret message sent by Alice (sender) only after the
receipt of the additional classical information of at least one bit for each qubit transmitted by Alice. In contrast, no
such additional classical information is required in QSDC ([17] and references therein). Further, extending the idea
of secure direct quantum communication, a few three-party protocols have recently been introduced [18, 19, 20].
In these protocols, Alice can directly communicate a secret message to Bob, if a controller (Charlie) allows them
to do so. These protocols are referred to as controlled QSDC (CQSDC) protocols. However, if we stick to the
definition of QSDC, it does not appear justified to refer to these protocols as CQSDC. This is so because in all
these protocols, Bob can read the message sent by Alice, only after Charlie provides him some additional classical
information (usually outcome of a measurement performed by Charlie). Thus, it would be more appropriate to
call them controlled DSQC (CDSQC) or controlled secure direct quantum communication. In what follows, we
refer to these protocols as CDSQC. Very recently, Hassanpour and Houshmand (HH) have proposed an interesting
entanglement swapping based protocol of CDSQC [18] using GHZ-like states. They claimed their protocol as a
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protocol of CQSDC, but the claim is not correct as in their protocol the receiver (Bob) can decode the secret
message only after the receipt of classical information from both the sender (Alice) and controller (Charlie). Thus,
the HH protocol is actually a protocol of DSQC. Further, they claimed their protocol as an efficient one by comparing
the qubit efficiency of their protocol with that of Gao et al. [19] and Dong et al. [20] protocols. However, a critical
analysis of HH protocol reveals that the efficiency reported in Ref. [18] can be considerably improved, and the
protocols of CDSQC can be designed using various quantum states and various alternative ways. This paper aims
to establish these facts. Further, in Ref. [18], Hassanpour and Houshmand have mentioned that in future they wish
to extend the HH protocol to a protocol of controlled bidirectional deterministic secure quantum communication
(CBDSQC). Here, we explicitly provide a protocol of CBDSQC and also provide some possible alternative methods
for realization of CBDSQC. In our protocols, PoP plays a very important role. This technique was first introduced
by Deng and Long in 2003, while they proposed a protocol of QKD based on this technique [21]. In what follows,
we will find that PoP helps us to improve the efficiency of the protocols of CDSQC and CBDSQC and to obtain
completely orthogonal-state-based protocols of CDSQC and CBDSQC.
Remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a protocol of CDSQC that uses
particle order permutation (PoP), dense coding and Bell states. Subsequently, we show that there exist several
alternative approaches through which CDSQC protocols can be designed. In Section 3, we show that our main
protocol of CDSQC can be turned to a protocol of CBDSQC and there exist infinitely many quantum channels that
can be used to realize CBDSQC. In Section 4, we compared the efficiency of the proposed protocols with that of the
HH protocol and established that the efficiency of CDSQC protocol can be increased considerably. To be precise,
we have shown that our protocols are much more efficient compared to the HH protocol. Finally, we conclude the
paper in Section 5, where we categorically list a set of important observations.
2 Controlled secure direct quantum communication using Bell states
Before we elaborate our protocol of CDSQC, it will be useful to briefly describe the basic ideas of some closely
connected protocols of QSDC and DSQC. Let us first describe the Ping-Pong (PP) protocol [6] of QSDC. In PP
protocol, Bob prepares a Bell state, keeps the second qubit with himself and sends the first qubit to Alice, who
encodes a message on the qubit she received and returns the qubit to Bob. Subsequently, Bob performs a joint
measurement on both the qubits using Bell basis and obtains the secret encoded by Alice. The encoding is done by
following a pre-decided rule: to communicate 0, Alice does nothing and to communicate 1, she applies X gate. Thus,
if Bob prepares |ψ+〉 = |00〉+|11〉√
2
as the initial state and receives the same state as the outcome of his measurement
then Alice has encoded 0, whereas if his measurement yields |φ+〉 = |10〉+|01〉√
2
then Alice has encoded 1. Clearly, in
PP protocol, full advantage of dense coding is not utilized. The same is utilized in Cai Li (CL) protocol [22], which
is a modified PP protocol with the following rule for encoding: to encode 00, 01, 10 and 11, Alice applies I, X, iY
and Z gates respectively. Now, we can easily see that Bob’s possible measurement outcomes |ψ+〉, |φ+〉, |φ−〉, and
|ψ−〉 correspond to Alice’s secret bits 00, 01, 10, and 11, respectively. Except this difference in the encoding part
the CL protocol is same as the PP protocol. In both of these protocols, Bob prepares the maximally entangled state
and sends a part of it to Alice. In contrast to PP and CL protocols, in Deng Long Liu (DLL) protocol [23], Alice
prepares a Bell state and sends the second qubit to Bob and verifies that he has received it without eavesdropping.
Subsequently, Alice encodes her message in the second qubit by following the same encoding rule as done in the CL
protocol and sends the qubit to Bob, who measures it in Bell basis. Here, it is important to note the following: (i)
If a third party (Charlie) distributes the entanglement to Alice and Bob, then CL and DLL protocols are equivalent
(this will be the case with the protocol proposed below). (ii) Clearly, CL and DLL protocols are more efficient than
PP protocol. Further, CL and DLL protocols can be easily realized using other entangled states where dense coding
is possible, but the efficiency will be higher for those states where maximal dense coding is possible. Consequently,
the efficiency of any dense coding based scheme that uses multipartite entangled states with odd number of qubits
have to be lower than the situation where the same scheme is realized using Bell states. So far, we have not discussed
anything about the security of PP, CL and DLL schemes. The security is achieved in two alternative ways. We
refer to these two alternative methods as BB84 subroutine and GV subroutine. In both the methods, to transmit
a sequence A of n message qubits, the sender creates an additional sequence D of n decoy qubits and inserts the
decoy qubits randomly into the sequence of message qubits. The combined sequence is sent to the receiver. In BB84
subroutine, the decoy qubits are prepared in a random sequence of {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉}, whereas in GV subroutine n
decoy qubits are prepared as |ψ+〉⊗n2 .
BB84 subroutine: In this method eavesdropping is checked using two or more mutually unbiased bases (i.e., using
conjugate coding) in a manner similar to what followed in BB84 protocol [1]. Specifically, after receiving the
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authentic acknowledgment from the receiver, the sender announces the position of the decoy qubits. Now,
the receiver measures all the decoy qubits randomly in {|0〉, |1〉} or {|+〉, |−〉} basis and announces which
basis she/he has used to measure a particular decoy qubit, position of that decoy qubit and outcome. The
sender compares the initial states of the decoy qubits with the outcomes of the receiver’s measurement in all
those cases where the basis used by the sender to prepare the decoy qubit is same as the basis used by the
receiver to measure it. Ideally, in the absence of eavesdropping the states should match the outcomes, while
any eavesdropping effort would lead to a mismatch.
GV subroutine: After receiving the authenticated acknowledgment from the sender that he/she has received all
the 2n qubits sent to him/her, the sender discloses the actual sequence of the decoy qubits, so that the receiver
can perform Bell measurement on partner particles (original Bell pairs) and reveal any effort of eavesdropping
through the disturbance introduced by Eve’s measurements.
To understand this point, consider a that the sender prepares |ψ+〉⊗2 = |ψ+ψ+〉1234 and randomly changes
the sequence of the particles and sends them to receiver. Now, also consider that Eve knows that two Bell
states are sent, but she does not know which qubit is entangled to which qubit. Consequently, any wrong
choice of partner particles would lead to entanglement swapping (say, if Eve does Bell measurement on qubit
numbers 13, 14 and/or 24 that would lead to entanglement swapping). Now, at a later time, when the sender
discloses the actual sequence of the transmitted qubits, the receiver uses that data to rearrange the qubits
into the original sequence and performs Bell measurement on them. Clearly, attempts of eavesdropping will
leave detectable traces through the entanglement swapping and whenever receiver’s Bell measurement would
yield any result other than |ψ+〉, they will know the existence of an eavesdropper.
In conventional PP, CL and DLL protocols, eavesdropping is checked by applying BB84 subroutine (i.e., using
conjugate coding), but the encoding and decoding is done by using orthogonal states. Thus, if we replace BB84
subroutine by GV subroutine, then we can obtain completely orthogonal state based counterparts of PP, CL and
DLL protocols. Specifically, orthogonal-state-based protocols of QSDC that correspond to PP, CL and DLL are
referred to as PPGV, CLGV and DLLGV, respectively [24, 25]. This discussion provides us sufficient background to
describe an efficient protocol of CDSQC which can be realized either using conjugate coding (if BB84 subroutine is
used for eavesdropping checking) or in a way which is completely orthogonal-state-based (if GV subroutine is used
for eavesdropping checking). Our protocol can be described in following steps:
1. Charlie prepares n Bell states |ψ+〉⊗n with n ≥ 2 . He uses the Bell states to prepare 2 ordered sequences as
follows:
(a) A sequence with all the first qubits of the Bell states: PA = [p1 (tA) , p2 (tA) , ..., pn (tA)],
(b) A sequence with all the second qubits of the Bell states: PB = [p1(tB), p2(tB), ..., pn(tB)],
where the subscripts 1, 2, · · · , n denote the order of a particle pair pi = {tiA, tiB}, which is in the Bell state.
2. Charlie applies an n-qubit permutation operator Πn on PB to create a new sequence as P
′
B = ΠnPB . The
actual order (Πn) is known to Charlie only.
3. Charlie prepares 2n decoy qubits either as a random sequence of {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉} or as |ψ+〉⊗n and randomly
inserts first (last) n decoy qubits in PA (P
′
B) to yield a larger sequence P
′′
A(P
′′
B) having 2n qubits. Subsequently,
Charlie sends P ′′A and P
′′
B to Alice and Bob, respectively. The actual positions of the decoy qubits are known
to Charlie only.
4. Charlie discloses the coordinates of the decoy qubits after receiving the authenticated acknowledgment of the
receipt of the qubits from Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob apply BB84 subroutine, if the decoy qubits are
prepared as a random sequence of {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉} to check the error rate (eavesdropping). Otherwise, (i.e.,
if the decoy qubits are prepared as |ψ+〉⊗n) they apply a GV subroutine to check error rate. If the computed
error rate is found lower than the tolerable error limit, they go to the next step, otherwise, they return back
to Step 1.
5. On successful completion of the error checking, Alice (Bob) understands that she (he) shares entanglement with
Bob (Alice). Alice can now encode her secret message by performing a Bell-state-based protocol of secure direct
communication (either a protocol of QSDC or that of DSQC) and send her qubits to Bob (after randomly in-
serting n decoy qubits). The specific QSDC/DSQC protocol may be chosen from a large class of protocols. For
example, they may use one protocol from the following set of protocols {PP,PPGV,CL,CLGV,DLL,DLLGV}.
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Since the sequence with Alice and Bob are different, even if Alice or Bob obtains the access of both PA and
P ′B, they will not be able to find out which particle is entangled with which particle. Thus, until Charlie
discloses Πn, Bob will not be able to decode the information encoded by Alice.
6. Charlie discloses Πn, when he plans to allow Bob to decode the information encoded by Alice.
7. Since the initial Bell states and exact sequence are known, Bob measures the initially entangled (partner)
particles in Bell basis and using the outcomes of his measurement and the knowledge of the initial state, he
decodes the secret sent by Alice.
Here, it is interesting to note that the above scheme is not limited to Bell state. There exist several alternative
approaches through which efficient CBDSQC schemes can be designed. Here, we list a few alternative paths.
2.1 Alternative 1: CDSQC using entangled states other than Bell states
It can be implemented by distributing other entangled states, too. To illustrate this point more clearly, we may
note that dense coding schemes for a large set of entangled states (e.g., W state, GHZ state, GHZ-like state, Q4
state, Q5 state, cluster state, |Ω〉 state, Brown state, etc.) are described in our recent works [26, 27]. In all such
dense coding schemes using N -qubit entangled states, initially Alice possesses p qubits (with N
2
≤p < N) and Bob
possesses (N − p) qubits. Subsequently, Alice encodes her message on the p qubits of her possession and sends the
message-encoded qubits to Bob, who measures the N -qubit state in an appropriate basis. Now, to implement a
scheme of CDSQC, Charlie should follow the same strategy as above and distribute p qubits of each of the N -qubit
entangled states to Alice (with appropriate security measures) and a reordered sequence of remaining (N−p) qubits
to Bob. Alice will encode her secret on her qubits by applying the unitary operations that lead to dense coding
and send the qubits to Bob who will be able to decode the message only after Charlie’s disclosure of the actual
order. Thus, this provides several possibilities of obtaining CDSQC. Specifically, CDSQC is possible using above
protocol and n copies of any of the following entangled states: W state, GHZ state, GHZ-like state, Q4 state, Q5
state, cluster state, |Ω〉 state, Brown state, etc. Interestingly, possibilities are not exhausted here. It is also possible
to design entanglement swapping based protocols of CDSQC using various other entangled states. In the following
subsection, we elaborate this point.
2.2 Alternative 2: CDSQC using entanglement swapping and PoP
In a recent work [28], we have shown that it is possible to design a protocol of DSQC that can transmit an s-bit
message using entanglement swapping, and the quantum states of the form
|ψ〉 = 1√
2s
2
s∑
i=1
|ei〉|fi〉, (1)
where {|ei〉} is a basis set in C2m : m ≥ s (where |ei〉 is a maximally entangled m-qubit state) and each of the basis
vectors is an m-qubit maximally entangled state ( m ≥ 2), and {|fi〉} is a basis set in C2l : l ≥ s ≥ 1. Elements
of {|fi〉} may be separable. Thus, |ψ〉 is an m+ l qubit state. Further, since {|ei〉} and {|fi〉} are basis sets, i 6= i′
implies that |ψ〉 is an entangled state. In general, we demand |ei〉 is a maximally entangled m-qubit state. In our
original protocol, we had assumed that the quantum state |ψ〉 described in Eq. (1) is prepared by Alice, who keeps
first m qubits with herself and sends the remaining l qubits to Bob in a non-clonable manner. By non-clonable
manner, we mean that Alice sends the qubits to Bob in such a way that Eve cannot clone the state |fi〉. To convert
our DSQC protocol [28] into an entanglement swapping based protocol of CDSQC, it would be sufficient to consider
that Charlie prepares |ψ〉⊗n and sends a sequence of nm qubits to Alice (the sequence contains first m qubits of
each copy of |ψ〉), and he sends remaining nl qubits to Bob after applying Πnl on them. Subsequently, Alice will
encode her secret message by faithfully following the entanglement swapping based DSQC protocol of ours [28], but
Bob will not be able to decode the message unless Charlie discloses Πnl. In [28], we have provided several examples
of quantum states of the form (1) (cf. Table 1 of [28]) which can be used to implement DSQC using entanglement
swapping. The above strategy of Charlie implies that all states of the form (1) can be used to implement CDSQC
using entanglement swapping. Specifically, we can use GHZ state, GHZ-like state, cat state, cluster state, Ω state, χ
state, brown state, etc. to implement CDSQC based on entanglement swapping. Interestingly, there exists another
alternative approach through which a protocol of CDSQC can be designed.
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2.3 Alternative 3: CDSQC using dense coding and (N + 1)-qubit entangled state
Consider that we have n copies of the (N + 1)-qubit quantum state of the form
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|ψ1〉A1,2,···,pB1,2,···,N−p |a〉C1 ± |ψ2〉A1,2,···,pB1,2,···,N−p |b〉C1
)
, (2)
where single qubit states |a〉 and |b〉 satisfy 〈a|b〉 = δa,b, and |ψi〉 is an element of an N -qubit basis set S, where
dense coding is possible if the receiver possesses p qubits and the sender possesses N − p qubits. The subscripts A,
B and C indicate the qubits of Alice, Bob and Charlie respectively and the condition
|ψ1〉 6= |ψ2〉 (3)
ensures that Charlie’s qubit is appropriately entangled with remaining N qubits. In a protocol that uses a quantum
state of this form, Charlie prepares n copies of the (N +1)-qubit quantum state |ψ〉 and transmits p qubits of each
state to Alice as a sequence A and rest N − p qubits to Bob as a sequence B. Charlie randomly inserts decoy
qubits in the sequences A and B, but does not alter the order of the qubits present in sequence B. Here, Charlie’s
control on the protocol arises from the fact that unless he measures his qubit in {|a〉, |b〉} basis, Bob is unaware
of the initial state on which Alice has encoded her secret message using unitary operators. However, with the
knowledge of Charlie’s measurement outcome, Bob will be able to decode the message sent by Alice. A very special
case of the above described general state is a GHZ-like state, where |ψi〉 ∈ {|ψ+〉, |ψ−〉, |φ+〉, |φ−〉 : |ψ1〉 6= |ψ2〉},
|ψ±〉 = |00〉±|11〉√
2
, |φ±〉 = |01〉±|10〉√
2
.
3 Controlled bidirectional deterministic secure quantum communica-
tion using Bell states
In the recent paper of Hassanpour and Houshmand [18], the authors have mentioned that in future they wish to
extend their proposal to a CBDSQC protocol. Here, we will show that it is a straightforward exercise to transform
our first protocol into a protocol of CBDSQC. In fact, there exists a large number of alternatives through which
one can produce it.
1. Charlie prepares 2n Bell states |ψ+〉⊗2n with n ≥ 2. He uses the Bell states to prepare 4 ordered sequences
as follows:
(a) A sequence with all the first qubits of the first n Bell states: PA1 = [p1 (tA) , p2 (tA) , ..., pn (tA)],
(b) A sequence with all the first qubits of the last n Bell states: PA2 = [pn+1 (tA) , pn+2 (tA) , ..., p2n (tA)],
(c) A sequence with all the second qubits of the first n Bell states: PB1 = [p1(tB), p2(tB), ..., pn(tB)],
(d) A sequence with all the second qubits of the last n Bell states: PB2 = [pn+1(tB), pn+2(tB), ..., p2n(tB)],
where the subscripts 1, 2, · · · , 2n denote the order of a particle pair pi = {tiA, tiB}, which is in the Bell state.
2. Charlie applies n-qubit permutation operators Πn1 and Πn2 on PA2 and PB1 to create two new sequences as
P ′A2 = Πn1PA2 and P
′
B1
= Πn2PB1 and sends the sequences PA1 and P
′
A2
(PB2 and P
′
B1
) to Alice (Bob) after
random insertion of n decoy qubits in each sequence. The actual order is known to Charlie only.
It is pre-decided that the first (last) n Bell states prepared by Charlie are to be used for Alice to Bob (Bob
to Alice) communication. Clearly, the rest of the protocol will be analogous to the previous one with the only
difference that Alice (Bob) will encode her (his) secret message on PA1 (PB2 ) and sends that to Bob (Alice),
who will be able to decode the encoded message only after Charlie’s disclosure of Πn1(Πn2).
Clearly, all the states for which dense coding is possible can be used to implement this protocol. Now, consider a
2N + 1 qubit state of the form
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|ψ1〉A1,2,···,pB1,2,···,N−p |ψ2〉B1,2,··· ,pA1,2,···,N−p |a〉C1 ± |ψ3〉A1,2,···,pB1,2,···,N−p |ψ4〉B1,2,···,pA1,2,···,N−p |b〉C1
)
,
(4)
where |a〉, |b〉 and |ψi〉 have the same meaning as in the protocol of CDSQC described above as Alternative 3. The
condition
|ψ1〉 6= |ψ3〉, |ψ2〉 6= |ψ4〉 (5)
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ensures that Charlie’s qubit is appropriately entangled with the remaining qubits. By appropriately entangled
we mean that unless Charlie measures his qubit in {|a〉, |b〉} basis and discloses the outcome. Alice and Bob are
not aware of the entangled states they share, and consequently the receiver does not know upon the receipt of
the sender’s information encoded qubits, how to decode the message. This provides the desired control. Here, a
measurement by Charlie in {|a〉, |b〉} basis will reduce the state into a product state of the form |ψi〉 ⊗ |ψj〉, where
first p qubits of |ψi〉 and last (N − p) qubits of |ψj〉 are with Alice and the remaining qubits are with Bob. Further,
this enables Alice and Bob to use the state |ψi〉(|ψj〉) for Alice to Bob (Bob to Alice) communication using dense
coding and we can have a scheme of bidirectional controlled DSQC as the receivers in both directions will be able
to decode the message encoded by the sender only after Charlie’s disclosure of his measurement outcome. Further,
in completely different contexts, we have shown that the 5-qubit quantum states of the following form are useful
for bidirectional controlled state teleportation (BCST) [29] and controlled bidirectional remote state preparation
(CBRSP) [30]:
|ψ〉12345 = 1√
2
(|ψ1〉A1B1 |ψ2〉A2B2 |a〉C1 ± |ψ3〉A1B1 |ψ4〉A2B2 |b〉C1) , (6)
where single qubit states |a〉 and |b〉 satisfy 〈a|b〉 = δa,b, |ψi〉 ∈ {|ψ+〉, |ψ−〉, |φ+〉, |φ−〉 : |ψ1〉 6= |ψ3〉, |ψ2〉 6= |ψ4〉},
|ψ±〉 = |00〉±|11〉√
2
, |φ±〉 = |01〉±|10〉√
2
. This is clearly a special case of the more general state (4), and we may conclude
that the 5-qubit states that are shown to be useful for BCST and CBRSP are also useful for controlled bidirectional
DSQC. In our earlier work [29], we have already shown that the total number of possible 5-qubit quantum states of
the form (6) is infinite. Thus, there exist infinitely many alternative 5-qubit quantum states that can be used for
implementation of bidirectional controlled DSQC.
4 Qubit efficiency of the protocols
The efficiency of a quantum cryptographic protocol is quantitatively measured using two analogous but different
parameters. The first one is defined as
η1 =
c
q
, (7)
where c denotes the total number of transmitted classical bits (message bits), and q denotes the total number of
qubits used [31]. The limitation of this simple measure is that it does not include the classical communication that
is required for decoding of the information in a DSQC protocol or CDSQC protocol. To circumvent this limitation
of the first measure, another quantitative measure [32] is defined as
η2 =
c
q + b
, (8)
where b is the number of classical bits exchanged for decoding of the message (classical communication used for
checking of eavesdropping is not counted). It is straightforward to visualize that η1 = η2 for all QSDC and QSDC
GV
protocols, but η1 > η2 for all DSQC protocols [cf. [17] for a detail discussion]. Hassanpour and Houshmand [18]
compared efficiency of their protocol of CDSQC with that of Gao et al. [19] and Dong et al. [20] protocols using
these quantitative measures of efficiency. However, they have used a different notation in which they referred to η1
of the present paper as η2 and vice versa, but that does not affect our analysis.
It is important to note that the decoy qubits used for eavesdropping check and classical communications involved
for eavesdropping check is not included in computation of qubit efficiency in Ref. [18]. Remaining consistent with
them, we may note that if any of the following protocols
{
CL, CLGV, DLL, DLLGV
}
is used as a sub-protocol in
our protocol of CDSQC, then each Bell state can be used for the transmission of 2 bits of classical information,
implying that for the whole protocol c = 2n, and it requires 2n qubits, so q = 2n. Further, disclosure of Πn requires
n-bit of classical information. Thus, b = n. This leads to η2 =
2n
3n
= 66.67%, and η1 =
2n
2n
= 100%. Clearly, this is
more efficient than the existing protocols. However, the efficiency calculation is not appropriate, we should count
the qubits used as decoy qubits. In the above, 2n decoy qubits are used in total to check eavesdropping during
Charlie’s transmission step. Another n qubits are used for eavesdropping check during Alice to Bob transmission.
Thus, q = 2n+ 3n = 5n and η2 =
2n
6n
= 33.33% and η1 =
2n
5n
= 40%.
In Section 3.3 of Ref. [18], some of the GHZ-like states prepared by Alice are used for security check. Hassanpour
and Houshmand did not explicitly mention how many qubits are used for security check. However, it is well known
that to obtain the required security, half of the transmitted qubits must be checked for eavesdropping. Specifically,
if 2x qubits (a random mix of message qubits and decoy qubits) travel through a quantum channel accessible to
Eve and x of them are tested for eavesdropping, then for any δ > 0, the probability of obtaining less than δn errors
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Protocol Without counting decoy qubits counting decoy qubits
η1 η2 η1 η2
HH [18] 33.33% 22.22% 16.66% 13.33%
proposed CDSQC protocol
(unidirectional using Bell states)
100% 66.67% 40% 33.33%
proposed CDSQC protocol (bidirectional
using Bell states)
100% 66.67% 40% 33.33%
CDSQC using Alternative 3
(unidirectional with Bell states)
66.67% 50% 33.33% 28.57%
CDSQC using Alternative 3
(unidirectional with (2m+ 1)-qubit
states (m≫ 1))
100% 100% 40% 40%
Table 1: Comparison of efficiency of HH protocol [18] and the protocols proposed here. In this table, we have not
included the efficiency of CDSQC protocols of Dong et al. [20] and Gao et al. [19] as in Ref. [18] it is already
established that HH protocol is more efficient than Dong et al. and Gao et al. protocols.
on the check qubits (decoy qubits), and more than (δ + ǫ)n errors on the remaining x qubits is asymptotically less
than exp[−O(ǫ2x)] for large x [33]. Thus, to obtain an unconditional security, we always need to check half of the
travel qubits for eavesdropping. Therefore, to obtain 2 copies of GHZ-like state that are used in Eq. (9) of Section
3.4 of Ref. [18], Alice must start the preparation phase (i.e., Section 3.2 of Ref. [18]) with 4 copies of GHZ-like
state. Therefore, q = 12 and consequently corrected qubit efficiency of the protocol of Hassanpour and Houshmand
should be η1 =
2
12
= 16.66%, and η2 =
2
12+3
= 13.33%. Clearly, the efficiency of the protocol reported here is 3 (2)
times more than that of the protocol of Hassanpour and Houshmand if we use η2(η1) as the measure of efficiency.
The CBDSQC scheme described above has the same qubit efficiency as that of the unidirectional scheme. This is
so, because, in the bidirectional case all quantities (e.g., q, m and b) just get doubled in comparison to their values
in unidirectional case. This linear change has no impact on the efficiency. However, Alternative 3 described in
Section 2.3 will have different values of efficiency. To illustrate this fact, we consider that the initial state used here
is n copies of GHZ-like states. Therefore, Charlie keeps n-qubits (all the last qubits) and sends the rest of the 2n
qubits to Alice and Bob through the quantum channel. For the secure transmission of those 2n qubits, Charlie has
to insert 2n decoy qubits, too. Thus, up to this step we require 5n qubits. Using dense coding Alice can send 2n
bits of information, thus c = 2n. However, during Alice to Bob communication, Alice has to add n decoy qubits
that will lead to q = 6n and thus η1 =
2
6
= 33.33% and η2 =
2
7
= 28.57%. However, efficiency of this scheme can
asymptotically approach 40%. To visualize this we may assume that the state prepared by Charlie in Alternative
3 is |Cat1〉|0〉+ |Cat2〉|1〉, where Cati is a 2m qubit Cat state, where maximal dense coding is possible. In this
case, Charlie sends m qubits to Alice and m qubits to Bob with equal amount of decoy qubits. Subsequently, after
encoding 2n bits of information using densecoding scheme, Alice would send Bobm message qubits that she received
from Charlie and m decoy qubits. Finally, Charlie announces the outcome of his measurement in computational
basis. This implies q = 5m, c = 2m and b = 1. Thus, η2 =
2m
5m+1
and for m≫ 1, we obtain η2 = 25 = 40%.
5 Conclusions
We conclude this paper by noting the following useful and important observations:
1. It is shown that in the strict sense the protocol of Hassanpour and Houshmand and the protocols designed
here are actually protocols of Controlled DSQC and not of Controlled QSDC as in these protocols, and all
the similar protocols, the controller has to disclose some information without which the receiver will not be
able to decode the information encoded by the sender.
2. In Ref. [18], Hassanpour and Houshmand described a protocol of CDSQC using entanglement swapping. For
the purpose, they have used two copies of GHZ-like states. Similar protocols can be devised using a large
number of entangled states of a generic form described by Eq. (1). Further, using block streaming of qubits
and PoP (as used in the first protocol described here) the controller can securely distribute quantum states of
the form (1) to the receiver and sender, and subsequently they can use QSDC/DSQC protocol described in
our earlier work [28]. This point is already elaborated in Section 2. In Sections 2 and 3, we have also provided
a large number of alternative approaches and alternative quantum states that lead to CDSQC. Thus, this
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paper provides many alternatives for experimental realizations of CDSQC.
3. Here, it is established that the efficiency reported in the efficient CDSQC protocol of Hassanpour and Housh-
mand can be considerably increased by appropriately using block streaming and PoP. The point is clearly
illustrated in the previous section and in Table 1.
4. The fact that the efficiency of entangled state based protocol is less compared to the proposed protocols is
not surprising as in the context of conventional QSDC and DSQC protocols designed by us [17, 26, 34], we
have already seen that using block streaming and PoP we can design maximally efficient protocols of QSDC
and DSQC, but the maximal efficiency was not achieved when we used entanglement swapping for the same
purpose [cf. our earlier work [28]].
5. In any protocol of CDSQC the receiver and sender need to be semi-honest [35]. Otherwise, it will always
be possible for Alice and Bob to avoid the control of Charlie and share the secret information (or quantum
state) by creating a quantum channel of their own. For example, dishonest Alice and Bob may decide to use
CL or DLL protocol in their original form and completely ignore Charlie. However, such situation will not
arise if we consider Alice and Bob as semi-honest as the semi-honest users follow the protocol, but tries to
cheat the controller remaining within the protocol. This very important point was not realized by Hassanpour
and Houshmand, and consequently they restricted their discussion to the external attacks (attacks of Eve).
However, for a protocol of CDSQC, it is important to show that the protocol is secure from internal attacks
of semi-honest receivers and senders. To do so, it is desirable (but not essential) that the controller prepares
the state (quantum channel). Otherwise, Alice can supply a separable qubit to Charlie and thus get rid of
his control. This desirable condition is not followed in HH protocol. Consequently, Alice can always cheat
Charlie, but the proposed protocol is free from such an internal attack.
6. All the protocols of CDSQC that are introduced until now [18, 19, 20] are conjugate-coding based. In these
protocols, security arises from the use of two or more mutually unbiased bases (MUBs). In contrast to them,
here we have shown that if we use GV subroutine for eavesdropping checking in all the steps of the proposed
protocols then we obtain orthogonal-state-based protocols of CDSQC. This is fundamentally important as it
establishes that protocols of CDSQC can be achieved without using conjugate coding (non-commutativity).
In brief, in this paper, we have established that it is possible to construct a large number of alternative protocols of
unidirectional and bidirectional efficient controlled secure direct quantum communication by using various quantum
states. Thus, the present theoretical work provides a large number of alternatives for the experimental realization
of a CDSQC or CBDSQC scheme. Keeping this fact in mind, we conclude the paper with an expectation that the
protocols proposed in this paper will be experimentally realized in near future.
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